Democratising and Judicialising: The Judicialisation of Politics by Rizzato-Devlin, Erin
1
Democracy  Society Volume 18  2021–2022
TRUTH AND INFORMATION
Democratising and Judicialising: The 
Judicialisation of Politics
Erin Rizzato Devlin
Within the classical tripartition of powers, courts and tri-
bunals have always held the most marginal role, limited 
by the interpretation of laws. In the last decades, however, 
judiciaries have been increasingly addressed with the task 
of resolving moral issues and political questions, drawing 
power away from representative institutions. The intention 
of this essay is to analyse the judicialisation of politics and 
how this emergent phenomenon is slowly reshaping the 
skeleton of political structures and mutating the political 
environment — particularly within the United Kingdom. 
In order to provide beneficial outcomes, this phenomenon 
should be accompanied by an attempt to embrace more 
democratic principles, seeking to promote a more inclusive 
space in the light of greater political responsibility, dialogue, 
and plurality of opinion.
Origins
The term ‘judicialisation’ refers to both the expansion 
of judges’ powers at the expense of politicians and execu-
tives by conferring decision-making rights to the former, 
and the proliferation of legal discourse, procedures, and 
decision-making methods outside the judicial sphere.1 The 
ambivalent term is employed to define multiple interrelated 
processes, including the increasing politicisation of the ju-
diciary which has characterised the political environment 
since the late twentieth century. In Britain, this has occurred 
in the form of greater judicial involvement in issues such 
as educational policy, prison discipline, and social welfare.2 
The phenomenon of ‘constitutional supremacy’ — in which 
judiciaries gradually establish their influence over legislative 
and administrative entities — has spread globally to over 
one hundred countries.3 
Constitutionalisation has been largely prominent in 
many post-authoritarian regimes transitioning to democ-
racy, such as those in Latin America, Asia, and the new 
Eastern European states emerging from the former USSR.4 
However, the adoption of a new constitution or the revision 
of rights have also been important factors in the diffusion of 
judicialisation as a trend. Since 1945, in fact, Japan, Turkey, 
India, the Philippines, and many European countries have 
attributed or re-ascribed review powers to their judiciaries, 
meaning that courts could criticise legislative enactments 
and administrative rules as inconsistent with constitutional 
norms, thus declaring them invalid.5 The institutionalisation 
of policies into legal agreements and the consequent decline 
of legislative supremacy thus prepared the ground for the 
decisive establishment of judiciaries as a global phenomenon. 
Among the many causes of judicialisation, democracy 
stands out as being one of the main drivers of this tendency.6 
Though judicial review is founded upon a counter-majoritar-
ian and unelected basis — which would appear to contradict 
the very notion of democracy — many theorists support 
the view that active judiciaries are both a prerequisite and 
by-product of democracy.7 The debate around the role of 
courts in a democracy has been ongoing since the origins of 
political thought, involving prominent figures such as John 
Stuart Mill, who wrote in the tradition of British parliamen-
tary supremacy, and Alexander Hamilton, who supported 
the independence of a United States judicial system.8 The 
issue of liberty within a constitutional system which aims 
for the protection of basic rights is crucial in the context 
of a democracy. In the imminent words of Charles-Louis 
Montesquieu, a predecessor of the judicialisation of political 
powers, “there is no liberty if the power of judging is not 
separated from the legislative and executive.”9
Additionally, it has also been argued that the judicialisa-
tion of politics has evolved concomitantly with the increasing 
de-politicisation of democracy. According to this view, the 
trans-nationalisation of the state, which primarily concep-
tualises itself as an actor in the international arena, leads 
to domestic neglect and a shrinking space for political dis-
course on a national dimension.10 Nonetheless, in order for 
a healthy democracy to survive, dialogue amongst citizens is 
necessary to provide legitimacy to any rising constitutional-
ism through free and engaged participation.
The Judicial-Legislative Relationship
Prior to the 1950s and the general rise of ‘new consti-
tutionalism,’ the role of judges was conscribed by a strict 
separation-of-powers doctrine and was therefore committed 
solely to interpreting the constitution. With the growth of 
‘judicialisation’ however, political issues have progressively 
been translated into legal questions, with courts now op-
erating as policymaking bodies by limiting the exercise of 
parliamentary authority, creating substantive policy, and 
desiring more control over political activity. In fact, the 
increased willingness of judges to regulate political activ-
ity, also beyond the legislatures, has been enforced through 
implemented standards of acceptable norms and behaviours 
for parties, interest groups, and individual agents.11 
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One consequence of this phenomenon is the rise of 
institutions of constitutional adjudication, particularly in 
countries that have historically been hostile to such prac-
tices. A clear example is the case of Britain, where legislative 
supremacy has been prominent throughout the country’s 
political history, as judicial review is non-binding. However, 
high courts have now achieved emancipation from their 
traditional role, and are entitled to interpret statutes and 
public acts, as well as declare whether statutory provisions 
are compatible with the constitutive elements of the State 
and can thereby challenge the acts of Parliament.12
What distinguishes judicial from political power is that 
the former involves an independent third party — embodied 
by the judge — whereas the latter includes a plurality of inter-
ests which enables the pursuit of a majority principle among 
a chorus of conflicting values. While in principle the judici-
ary is devoted to the impartiality of a single judge, legislative 
practices are characterised by the possibility of bargain and 
compromise which enables discussion and dialogue between 
parties, rather than the assignment of a single solution to 
a complex dispute. The role of reason emphasised by the 
judicial power thus privileges solutions which are meant 
to be impartial yet universally accepted, clearly in contrast 
with the appraisal of conflicting values that distinguishes 
the legislative or executive.13 In addition, the judiciary is an 
organ which must be petitioned into action, given that it 
does not operate on its own initiative like a legislature can. 
For these reasons, an unelected judiciary system enabled 
to operate as a policymaking body, rather than countering 
a tyranny of the majority, may become a danger if it fails 
to interact with other political entities, including citizenry, 
and if its roles and fields of action are not clearly legitimised. 
In fact, the forms in which judiciaries can relate to other 
powers are considered to be ‘from without,’ through the 
judicial review of executive or legislative actions, or ‘from 
within,’ by which the introduction or expansion of judicial 
modalities delineates the principle of more adjudication and 
less administration.14 It is then clear that constitutionalism 
and administration are inversely proportional. Thence, the 
role of courts is limited to defending fundamental rights and 
freedoms in their ‘negative’ sense, defined by Isaiah Berlin 
as the mere absence of interference.15 The judicialisation of 
politics may, however, have a profound impact on political 
freedom as a whole, by undermining essential elements 
such as action and participation, which constitute the very 
heart of a true democracy.
Prospects
In the framework of this growing reliance on judicial 
procedures and courts, it is important to consider arguments 
for and against the judicialisation of politics, and the con-
comitant politicisation of law, in a democracy. The conflict 
between constitutionalism and basic democratic principles is 
at the core of these phenomena. The main line in defence of 
constitutionalism aims to portray judicial review as a means 
of achieving basic democratic principles, which, through 
a supposedly apolitical and impartial third party, aims to 
protect rights more effectively. This is also enhanced by the 
independence of judiciary power which is supposed to be 
more insulated and therefore less self-interested.16 However, 
although the main arguments against judicialisation have 
often appealed to the unelected and ‘counter-majoritarian’ 
nature of judiciaries, perhaps the strongest would be that 
which refers to the institutional basis upon which they are 
founded. This, in fact, appeals to an empirical experience 
of institutions which are organically embedded and contex-
tualised, not eradicated from their socio-political system. 
The act of deference of courts itself is due to political 
rather than judicial factors, and as such has been portrayed 
as a mechanism of ‘hegemonic preservation’ pursued by the 
legislatures.17 The issue is therefore political, and as such 
should be addressed using democratic means, through both 
discourse and deliberation. Judicial empowerment should 
also be subject to political contestation by those who are 
affected by their practices to avoid the political apparatus 
shifting into what some have described as a juristocracy. As 
discussed above, legislative power is mainly directed by the 
people through election and participation, the main sources 
of legitimacy in a democracy. On the contrary, the issue 
emerging with judicialisation is the lack of a concomitant 
process of democratisation in society, which is not necessary 
for its occurrence but enables it to act legitimately. 
Lastly, the judicialisation of politics must be followed by 
a new vocabulary of legitimising principles to help guide 
the legal translation of intrinsically political matters. This 
requires a re-allocation of authority which must also hap-
pen through deliberation and public contestation. For these 
reasons, a balance between judicial and democratic power 
presents itself as the solution to avoid the two possible ex-
tremes of a government led by pure adjudication, and of a 
total majoritarianism.18 
Although often limiting political discussion within the 
public sphere, judicial power is crucial to preserving negative 
freedom and ensuring the protection of fundamental rights. 
However, in order for this to be effective and sustainable, it 
must be analysed in its political origins and integrated with 
full democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the phenomenon of 
political judicialisation may, in the near future, find a meeting 
point between constitutionalism and majoritarianism only 
through the conciliation of these mutually-supporting prin-
ciples. In other words, judicialisation should be legitimised 
through a democratic revision of the separation of powers.
Erin Rizzato Devlin is an independent writer and researcher in 
Politics and Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.
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